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MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Eric Corthay*
Abstract
From the Sahel-Sahara region to Afghanistan, from Syria to the Philippines, the international
community has been witnessing, for a number of years now, the establishment of military training
and support partnerships, the launch of joint military operations and the formation of international
coalitions which have had a recent upsurge, all of these having been specifically designed to fight
against and eliminate the terrorist scourge. These different forms of military cooperation have been
justified either by a consent or request from the territorial State, by the right of self-defense,
or even by an authorization from the UN Security Council. This article’s purpose is to analyze
the legal framework within which the operations must fall in order for them to be lawful and
their justifications to be valid. Through the analysis of doctrinal debates, actual State practice and
the decisions of the International Court of Justice, this paper examines notably the criteria that make
an intervention by invitation valid, the limitative conditions of invocation and implementation of the
right of self-defense, and finally the original as well as the current mechanism of collective security
that has led to the establishment of peace or multilateral operations.

Keywords: Military training, terrorism, the right of self defense

I. INTRODUCTION
For years, terrorism has become a serious concern to the international community. In order to prevent and eradicate this scourge that
threatens international peace and security, States have been called upon
for cooperation. International cooperation against terrorism is characterized by the implementation of a wide array of measures addressed
by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy (e.g. education, law
enforcement, judicial cooperation, sanctions, and capacity building).
This paper does not intend to address all the different types of cooperation but rather to focus on a specific one, namely the military cooperation among States while combating terrorism. Military cooperation
among members of the international community takes different forms
ranging from training national forces of other countries, sharing intelligence, to launching joint combat operations against terrorists harbored
* Assistant Professor of International Law and International Relations, Bahrain Polytechnic; eric_corthay@hotmail.com. Foreign Editor of IJIL.
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in the territory of a third State.
The military operations launched in the context of the fight against
terrorism are not left to the sole discretion of the States. On the contrary they are governed by international law, and, very often, by the jus
contra bellum which is a legal regime consisting of a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter – the prohibition of the use of force in the international relations between States
– and of two confirmed and recognized exceptions that are the right
of self-defense and the use of force authorized by the UN Security
Council. Therefore, in order to determine whether the different forms
of military cooperation against terrorism fall within the framework of
the jus contra bellum, it is necessary to clarify the content and scope of
the principle (I) and its two exceptions (II).
II. THE PRINCIPLE PROHIBITING HTE USE OF FORCE
Since 1945 at least, international law has been proscribing the threat
or use of force in the international relations between States. This fundamental principle prohibiting the use of force is enshrined in Article
2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter which provides that “[a]ll Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As this provision “constitutes the basis of any discussion
of the problem of the use of force”1, a clarification of its terms seems
therefore required. Following on, it will be stressed that some forms
of military cooperation, when based on a valid consent of the territorial State, do not fall within the ambit of the jus contra bellum.
A. CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE: AN OVERVIEW
The notion of ‘force’ has created some debates. However, the prevailing view is that the term must be limited to the notion of direct or
indirect ‘armed force’ and does not comprise other forms of force like,
Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in: Brunno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the
United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, Munich, C.H. Beck, 2002, at 116.
1
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for example, political and economic coercion2. Indeed, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, a document annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the
General Assembly which contains an interpretation of the fundamental
principles of the UN Charter, the section dealing with the prohibition
of force only refers to the notion of armed or military force. The
other forms of force, such as the economic and political coercion, are
covered by the section dealing with the principle of non-intervention3.
Moreover, in order to be qualified as a ‘use of force’ under Article 2,
paragraph 4, a military operation must affect the territory, people or
objects placed under the jurisdiction of another State4. Indeed, the mere
non authorized flights by foreign military aircrafts over the airspace of
a third State are, in general, qualified as a violation of the sovereignty
of the territorial sovereign but not a violation of the principle embodied in the paragraph 45.
Furthermore, the wording ‘international relations’ means that the
threat or use of force proscribed by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
UN Charter is limited to the international relations between States. In
other words, the jus contra bellum is essentially an inter-State regime
proscribing military coercion by a State against another one, in violation of the sovereignty of the latter6.
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter also provides that States shall
See notably Hans Wehberg, ‘L’interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et les
problèmes qui se posent’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International
Law, t. 78, 1951, at 69 [hereinafter Collected Courses…] ; Dereck W. Bowett, SelfDefence in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1958, at 148 ; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, at 362.
3
For other reasons in favor of a restrictive interpretation of the notion of force, see
notably Eric Corthay, La lutte contre le terrorisme international, De la licéité du
recours à la force armée, Bâle, Helbing Lichtenhahn,
2012, at 37-38, Albrecht Randelzhofer, supra note 1, at 118.
4
Ian Brownlie, supra note 2, at 363-364; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, public sitting, 15 June
1998, Fisheries Jurisdictions (Spain v. Canada), CR 1998/13, at 59, para. 22.
5
Ian Brownlie, ibid.
6
Olivier Corten, The Law Against War, The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2012,
at 169.
2
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refrain from the threat or use of force “against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Following a narrow
interpretation of the provision, some scholars argue that the principle
prohibiting the use of force is infringed only when a military operation intends to overthrow a foreign government or annex a foreign
territory7. In their opinion, therefore, targeted killings, rescue operations, as well as the bombardment of terrorists’ training camps abroad
would not be prohibited by the principle8. Such a view, however, must
be rejected. At the Conference of San Francisco in 1945 the terms ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ have not been included
in the paragraph 4 to restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of
force, but rather to emphasize the need to protect these two core
elements of statehood9. According to the predominant opinion, the
principle in question proscribes any kind of forcible trespassing that
violates international frontiers and State sovereignties10. The term ‘territorial integrity’ must be read as ‘territorial inviolability’11 or inviolability of frontiers, and the ‘political independence’ of a State – defined
as the right of a State to exercise its internal and international political
sovereignty without outside interference – is deemed to be immediately
infringed when a foreign military action is conducted without the authorization of the territorial State, even if that action does not result in
See notably Dereck W. Bowett, supra note 2, at 152 and 186 ; Rosalyn Higgins,
‘The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States : United Nations Practice’,
BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, at 317.
8
See notably Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave : Law and Foreign Policy, New
York, Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1979, at 141-145 ; Gregory M. Travalio,
‘Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force’, Wisconsin Int’l L.J.,
vol. 18, 2000, at 166 ; Jordan J. Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond’, Cornell Int’l L.J., vol. 35, num. 3, 2002, at 536.
9
See declarations of Honduras, Egypt, New Zealand, Ethiopia, Bolivia, UNCIO,
1945, vol. IV.
10
See notably Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law’, Collected Courses…, t. 81, 1952-II, at 493 ; Ian
Brownlie, supra note 2, at 267 ; Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law
in the Past Third of a Century’, Collected Courses…, t. 159, 1978-I, at 89-92.
11
This expression is notably used by Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, International Law : a
Treatise, vol. 2, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 7th ed., H. Lauterpacht (ed.), London,
New York, Longmans Green, 1952, at 154.
7
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overthrowing the government of the said State12.
Finally, one must be clearly reminded that Article 2, paragraph 4,
in fine (“[…] or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations”) is not intended to restrict but, on the contrary,
to strengthen a general and comprehensive prohibition of force in the
international relations between States13. As stated by the delegate of
the United States during the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter
in 1945, “the intention of the authors of the original text was to state
in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the phrase
‘or in any other manner’ was designed to ensure that there should be no
loopholes”14.
B. MILITARY COOPERATION NOT FALLING WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE JUS CONTRA BELLUM
Some forms of military cooperation do not fall within the ambit
of the regime of the jus contra bellum as defined supra. In the context
of the fight against terrorism, one might indicate at least two types of
cooperation not covered by that regime. The first one is the advisory
support, training and supply of military equipment by one State on the
request of another one. This scenario has been exemplified when,
under the framework of an annual joint exercise, Balikatan 02-1,
US military advisors trained Philippine Armed Forces in anti terrorist
tactics and intelligence gathering techniques15. Another example is the
supply of military equipment to the Kurds in northern Iraq, in the past
few months, by an emerging coalition of States, including notably the
United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy16. This supEric Corthay, supra note 3, at 57-58.
See notably Hans Wehberg, supra note 2, at 70 ; Quincy Wright, ‘The Outlawry of
War and the Law of War’, AJIL, vol. 47, num. 3, 1953, at 370 ; Ian Brownlie, ‘The
Use of Force in Self-Defence’, BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, at 236 ; Albrecht Randelzhofer,
supra note 1, at 123.
14
UNCLOS, 1945, vol. VI, at 335. See also the proposed amendments made by
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Iran, at 557-563.
15
Wayne A. Larsen, Beyond Al Qaeda: Islamic Terror in South East Asia, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama, 2005, at 26.
16
On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the support to Iraqi and
Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment, and highlighted that
allies were already sending arms and assistance to Iraqi security forces. See
12
13
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port, given with the consent of Iraq’s central government, aims at
aiding Kurds in their battle against militants of the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), stopping their expansion throughout the country,
protecting civilians, and avoiding a destabilization of the region17.
The second type of cooperation concerns the combat operations
against non-state actors with the request or consent of the host State.
This is notably the case of the current air campaign against ISIL conducted by a coalition of States (US, France, UK and others) on the
request of the Iraqi government and with the help of Iraqi security
forces on the ground gathering intelligence18. Another example is the
French Operation Barkhane, launched in August 2014 on the basis of
defense agreements, which consists in securing the Sahel-Sahara region
by supporting G-5 Sahel troops (Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and
Mauritania) and preventing the setting up of terrorist sanctuaries19.
Statement by the President on ISIL, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress- office/2014/09/10/remarks-president-barack-obama-address-nation. As well,
Iranian forces are helping the Iraqi army on the ground, providing weapons, intelligence and advisors, see Kate Brannen, ‘Teheran’s Boots on the Gound’, Foreign
Policy, 10 September 2014, available at: http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/
2014/09/10/tehraboots_on_the_ground_iraq_syria_islamic_state_isis _iran. Also, in
September, Saudi Arabia gave the green light for the US Request for an anti-ISIS
training program, see Foreign Policy, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2014/09/11/fps_situation_report_obama_lays_out_plan_475_more_troop
s_for_iraq_but_no_boots_o.
17
EurActive.de, ‘Merkel defends decision to arm Iraqi Kurds with German weapons’, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/merkel-defends-decision-arm-iraqi-kurds-german- weapons-308148.
18
Karen De Young, ‘Obama approves deployment of 350 more troops to Iraq’,
The Washington Post, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/obama-approvesdeployment-of-350-more-troopsto-iraq/2014/09/02/b05aa99a-3306-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, ‘A broad approach to countering the Islamic State’, The
Washington Post, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/02/a-broadapproach-to-countering-the-islamicstate/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20
Brief&utm_campaign=2014_T he%20Middle%20East%20Daily_9.3.14. It is also
said that Iranian forces are helping the Iraqi army on the ground in conducting joint
operations against ISIL
19
For more information, see the French Minister of Defense’s website, in: www.
defense.gouv.fr; see also Andrew McGregor, ‘Operation Barkhane: France’s New
Military Approach to Counter-Terrorism in Africa’, TerrorismMonitor, vol. XII, issue
Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015
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It goes without saying that consented military training and supply
of military equipment per se do not constitute any violation of Article
2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, as no ‘resort to force’ occurs in
casu. Moreover, combat missions by foreign troops on the territory of
another State, with the consent or on the request of the latter, must be
considered as interventions by invitation and as such are legal. Indeed,
it is not contested that consent may justify a military operation by one
State in the territory of another one. In its Resolution 387 (1976), for
example, the Security Council recalled “the inherent and lawful right
of every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance
from any other State or group of States”. Intervention by invitation
must not be considered as an exception to the principle prohibiting the
use of force. Neither must consent be considered as a circumstance
excluding the wrongfulness of a military operation20. Indeed, for consent to be valid, it must be given ex ante facto. The resulting operation
consented to does not constitute, as such, a violation of the principle,
and therefore, as there is no breach of an international obligation, no
wrongful act occurs and consequently no wrongfulness that consent can
preclude21.
Consent justifies a military operation by one State in the territory
of another only if it is valid. In the light of State practice, it can be affirmed that its validity depends upon several criteria. Firstly, consent
must be internationally attributable to a State, i.e. “it must emanate
from an organ whose will is deemed, at the international level, to be
the will of the State”22. Secondly, as already pointed out supra, consent must be given by the territorial State prior to the commission of
15, 25 July, 2014, at 3-4
20
See, with regard to the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, Resolution 56/83
of 12 December 2001 in which the General Assembly took note of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter ILC
Articles].
21
Roberto Ago, ‘Eighth report on State responsibility: The internationally wrongful
act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1979, at 30, para. 55 [hereinafter Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n].
22
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-first session, 14
May – 3 August 1979, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, Part Two, 1979, at 113, para. 15.
426
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the act23. Thirdly, consent must be given freely; i.e. “consent must not
be vitiated by ‘defects’ such as error, fraud, corruption or coercion”24.
Fourthly, consent must be clearly established and not presumed25. In
addition, it should be noted that a particular act, which otherwise would
have been considered as a breach of an international obligation, is lawful only if conducted “within the limits which the State expressing
the consent intends with respect to its scope and duration”26. Therefore,
as long as these criteria are fulfilled, one might consider that the consent given by the States mentioned supra (e.g. Iraq, Sahel countries)
are valid. Consequently, the foreign military operations carried out in
their territory are not in breach of the principle embodied in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter.
III. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE PROHIBITING THE
USE OF FORCE
For years, several counter-terrorism military operations, sometimes carried out by a coalition of States, have been conducted in
different places in the World. All of these operations have been
justified by either of the two exceptions to the principle of non resort to
force, i.e. the right of self-defense (1), or an authorization given by the
Security Council (2). The following paragraphs aim at clarifying the
content and scope of these two exceptions in order to assess the legality
of the operations.
A. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
An example of the call for international cooperation in the context
of the fight against terrorism occurred in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush said:
“[w]e ask every nation to join us” in the fight against terror27. On
10 November 2001, before the General Assembly, he also stated that
Ibid., at 113, para. 16.
Ibid., at 112, para. 12.
25
Ibid., at 112, para. 14
26
Ibid., at 113, para. 17.
27
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and American
People, 20 September 2001, available at: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm
23
24
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“[t]he conspiracies of terror are being answered by an expanding
global coalition. […] We are asking for a comprehensive commitment to this fight. We must unite in opposing all terrorists […]”28. A
large majority of States responded positively to that appeal. It must be
mentioned that the United States left them with little choice but to cooperate. Indeed, President Bush clearly stated: “[e]very nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists”.29 The support of the international community was
manifold: politically, financially, and sometimes militarily30.
Military cooperation against Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan is illustrated by the joint US and UK Operation Enduring
Freedom which was launched on October 2, 2001, and justified through
the right of self-defense. Indeed, in the letter addressed to the President
of the Security Council, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, declared that “the United States
of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the
exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence
following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United
States on 11 September 2001”31. Many other cooperating nations did
not operate in front line missions on the ground, but merely provided
air, sea and land support (e.g. bases, territorial access, and overflight
permission) to countries engaged in offensive missions in Afghanistan.
More recently, on September 23, 2014, the United States and an
array of Arab allies launched airstrikes in Syria against ISIL and AlQaida targets which pose terrorist threats to the US and its allies. These
strikes have also been justified by the right of self-defense. In her letter
to the UN Secretary-General, the US Permanent Representative, Samantha J. Power, declared: “States must be able to defend themselves,
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective selfUN Doc. A/56/PV.44, at 8 and 9.
President George W. Bush, supra note 27.
30
See declarations of States before the General Assembly at the 44th plenary meeting,
10 to 16 November 2001, UN Doc. A/56/PV.44 to A/56/PV.57.
31
UN Doc. S/2001/946. See also the letter dated 7 October 2001 from the
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/947.
28
29
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defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the
case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.
The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these
safe-havens effectively itself”.32
In the opinion of the present writer, Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan and the airstrikes in Syria do not comply with the law
de lege lata, and, in particular, with the customary law of self-defense
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Article requires:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations”. Taking into consideration scholarly
works, international jurisprudence and State practice, it will be shown
infra that the right of self-defense can only be invoked in the case
of ongoing armed attack by a State33. As the conditions of invocation
(armed attack by a State) and implementation (ongoing armed attack)
of the right of self-defense have not been met, the two military operations could not and should not have been justified by that right.
1. The conditions of invocation of the right of self-defense
the requirement for an armed attack to exist was confirmed in the
Nicaragua case by the International Court of Justice which held that
such an attack is “the condition sine qua non required for the exercise
of the right of […] self-defence”34. The question as to whether a
particular use of force may be qualified as an armed attack depends
upon the degree of gravity of the said act. Indeed, in the Nicaragua
case, the Court held: “As regards certain particular aspects of the principle [prohibiting the use of force], it will be necessary to distinguish
the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed
attack) from other less grave forms.”35 In order to determine whether
See the letter available at: http://justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolutionarticle-51-letters-force-syria- isil-khorasan-group/.
33
Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 93.
34
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 237 [hereinafter
Nicaragua case]. See also, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, para. 51 [hereinafter Oil Platforms case].
35
Nicaragua case, para. 191.
32
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the degree of gravity necessary for an armed attack has been reached,
the scale and effect of the attack need to be analyzed.36
Terrorist attacks, as those perpetrated in New York (2001) or Bali
(2002), show that non- state actors are capable of severely endangering
national and international peace and security with, at the very least,
the same degree of effectiveness and horror as the conduct of any conventional armed attack by States. Therefore, some scholars and certain
members of the international community assert that an armed attack
giving rise to the right of self-defense can be carried out by individuals or groups of individuals even when those entities have no suffic�
cient connection with a State for attributing their violent conduct to that
State.37 However, many scholars, to which one subscribes, have serious reservations with regard to the opinion according to which the act
that triggers a reaction in self-defense might be the conduct of a person
or group of persons which is not attributed to a State.38
a. The jurisprudence of the international court of justice
The International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations and whose task is mainly to explain
the state of international law on particular points at a specific moment, has recalled many times that an armed attack is and must be
Ibid., para. 195.
See notably Humphrey Waldock, supra note 10, at 463-464, and 498; Dereck W.
Bowett, supra note 2, at 55- 56; James E. S. Fawcett, ‘Intervention in International
law. A Study of Some Recent Cases’, Collected Courses…, 1961-II, at 363; Ruth
Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden’, Yale J.Int’l
L., vol. 24, num. 2, 1999, at 564; Thomas M. Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of
Self-Defense’, AJIL, vol. 95, num. 4, 2001, at 840; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression
and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, at 192 and
214, Jordan J. Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Beyond’, Cornell Int’l L.J., vol. 35, num. 3, 2002, at 534.
38
See inter alia Joseph L. Kunz, ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 41, num. 4, 1947, at 878;
Hans Kelsen, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self- Defense under the Charter of
the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 42, num. 4, 1948, at 791; Eric P. J. Myjer, Nigel D.
White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack : an Unlimited Right to Self-Defence ?’, JCSL, vol.
7, 2002, at 7; Marcelo G. Kohen, ‘Is the Legal Argument for Self-Defence against
Terrorism Correct ?’, in: Wybo P. Heere (ed.), From Government to Governance,
The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the International and European Legal
System, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003, at 290.
36
37
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understood as being an act of State. For example39, in 1986, in the
Nicaragua case, the Court linked and quasi assimilated the concept
of armed attack mentioned under Article 51 of the UN Charter with
the concept of aggression used in the Annex (Definition of Aggression) to the Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General Assembly40.
Article I of the Annex defines the concept of aggression as “[…]
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”41.
Almost twenty years later, in the Wall case, when answering the
question whether the construction of a wall between Israel and Palestine could be justified by the right of self-defense, the Court held
that “Article 51 of the Charter […] recognizes the existence of an
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one
State against another State.”42 However, as “Israel [did] not claim
that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State” the Court
concluded that Article 51 of the UN Charter had no relevance in this
case43.
b. The opinion of the international law commission
The International Law Commission, which is responsible for the
codification and progressive development of international law,
points out that the act which triggers an action in self-defense must
be an internationally wrongful act, i.e. an act of State. Indeed, in the
Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, Roberto
Ago underlined that “the State takes action [in self-defense] after
having suffered an international wrong, namely, the non-respect of
one of its rights by the State against which the action in question is
directed”44. Then, when clarifying the nature of the ‘wrong’, Ago
See also as another example but not detailed here, Oil Platforms case, supra note
34, paras. 51 and 61.
40
Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 195.
41
Emphasis added.
42
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 139.
43
Ibid.
44
Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility: The internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n, Vol. II, Part. One, 1980, at 54, para. 89.
39
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underscored that “the only international wrong which, exceptionally, makes it permissible for the State to react against another State
by recourse to force, despite the general ban on force, is an offence
which itself constitutes a violation of the ban”45.
When non-state actors launch an attack against a State from the
territory of another one but their conduct is not attributed to any
State, no internationally wrongful act is committed by them. In particular, no violation of the fundamental principle on the prohibition
of the use of force, and consequently no armed attack in the meaning of Article 51 can occur because the principle on the prohibition
of the use of force applies only to States and in their relations with
others. Therefore, according to Ago, in such a situation the victim
State is not authorized to invoke the right of self-defense, although
it is still lawful for that nation to take appropriate security measures
within its territory in order to defend its citizens and maintain peace
and security.
c. The rules of attribution
For the reasons mentioned above, an armed attack is and can only be
the conduct of a State. In other words, in order to assess if the 9/11
terrorist attacks are susceptible to being referred to as an armed attack, it is inter alia necessary to determine if that act is attributable
to a State. To do that, the rules of attribution mentioned under Chapter II of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts must be applied46. Chapter II specifies the limitative
conditions under which a conduct is attributable to a State.
With regard to Operation Enduring Freedom, none of these conditions have been invoked by the United States or the United Kingdom to declare that the 9/11 attacks were attributable to a State.
Indeed, not once did they contend that bin Laden and his group
were de jure organs of a government (Art. 4), or that their conduct
was carried out on the instructions or under the direction or control
of a State (Art. 8), or that their actions had been acknowledged and
adopted by State authorities ex post facto (Art. 11).
Concerning the airstrikes in Syria against ISIL, some scholars and
law practitioners hold the view that when a State is ‘unwilling or
45
46

Ibid.
See ILC Articles, supra note 20.
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unable’ to prevent individuals from using its territory for launching terrorist attacks, it may be lawful for the targeted State – or
other States in case of collective self-defense – to use force in selfdefense in order to address that threat47. This raises the question of
whether a new condition of attribution has emerged, and more exactly, whether failure to prevent or punish terrorist attacks conducted by non-state actors justifies inferring the host State’s complicity
in the individuals’ acts, and consequently regarding the terrorist acts
as the conduct of the host State.
i. The theory of complicity and the standard of due diligence
According to the controversial theory of complicity invoked
today by some scholars in the context of the fight against terrorism48, the actions carried out in the territory of the victim State
by private entities residing in the territory of the host State are
attributed to that latter State, not because the private entities
would have acted on its behalf, on its instructions, or under its
direction or control, but simply because the host State has failed
to fulfill its ex ante facto duty of not tolerating, supporting or
encouraging (e.g. funding, arming, training) the preparation in
its territory of actions directed against the victim State, or its
ex post facto duty of prosecuting and punishing or extraditing
the offenders for their wrong49. In other words, States would
be complicit and would be held responsible for the conduct of
individuals when they fail to fulfill their international obligations of vigilance. Such an obligation can be broadly defined as
a requirement for each State to protect other States, as well
as the representatives and the nationals of these other States,
against the illicit acts carried out or about to be perpetrated by
See John B. Bellinger, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, conference given at
the London School of Economics, 31 October 2006, available at: http://www2.lse.
ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf.
48
Yoram Dinstein, ‘Comments on the Presentations by Nico Kirsch and Carsten
Stahn’, in: Walter Christian, et al. (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
International Law: Security versus Liberty?, Heidelberg, Springer, 2004, at 920;
Michael Byers, ‘Not yet havoc: geopolitical change and the international rules
on military force’, Review of International Studies, vol. 31, supplement, 2005, at 58.
49
Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility, The internationally wrongful
act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II,
1972, at 119-120, para. 135 (theory rejected by Ago).
47

Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015

433

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

individuals, when these acts are conceived, prepared and/or carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction50.
It is worth noting that the obligation of vigilance is not absolute.
It is an obligation of conduct and not of result51. The host State
– Syria, for instance – is only required to employ all means
reasonably available to prevent or repress non-state actors’
conduct. When doing so, the host State fulfils its obligation of
vigilance and cannot be accused of tolerating or acquiescing to
the terrorist activities, even if it is not able to efficiently prevent or repress such activities52. Contrariwise, in the event
Syria is able but unwilling to take measures against ISIL it
would breach its obligation of due diligence.
ii. A fundamental difference between terrorists ‘conduct and states’
conduct
It is essential to understand that a violation of the obligation
of due diligence by Syria doesn’t at all imply that the country
engages its international responsibility for the injurious conduct
of ISIL. Indeed, acts committed by private individuals acting as
such cannot be considered as acts of the State and therefore the
latter is not held responsible for the acts of the formers53. Nevertheless, actions of private individuals might reveal the existence of an internationally wrongful act – an action or omission
of organs of the State –, and it is that very wrongful act which
entails the international responsibility of the State.
The acts of individuals are described as ‘catalysts’, and what
is attributed to the State and might involve its international reRiccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of International Responsibility of States’, GYIL, vol. 35, 1992, at 34 ff.; François Dubuisson, ‘Vers un renforcement des obligations de diligence en matière de lutte contre le
terrorisme?’, in: Karine Bannelier, et al. (ed. by), Le Droit international face au terrorisme, CEDIN-Paris I, Pedone, Cahiers internationaux num. 17, 2002, at 141-157.
51
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2007, para. 430 [hereinafter Genocide Convention case].
52
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 301; Genocide Convention
case, supra note 51, para. 430.
53
Roberto Ago, supra note 49, at 96, para. 63.
50
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sponsibility are not the catalysts per se but what is revealed
by the catalysts54. In the context of the fight against terrorism,
the catalysts – i.e. the conduct of terrorists acting as private individuals – might highlight the violation of the due diligence
obligation by the State in whose territory terrorist actions are
conceived and prepared, i.e. the violation of the duty to prevent
terrorist attacks and/or to punish their acts injurious to the other
States. Such a breach arises notably when the host State uses
indirect force, examples of which are listed in the annex to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General Assembly: organizing, assisting in terrorists acts in another State, acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory, etc.
When infringing its due diligence obligation, the host State engages its international responsibility towards other States and is
required to cease the wrongful conduct and to make full reparation for the injury caused55. For its part, the targeted State has
the right to take countermeasures against the host State in
order to induce the latter to comply with its international
obligations56 – for example the obligation not to infringe the
principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the UN Charter and referred to in the annex to Resolution 2625 (XXV). However, the targeted State
is not allowed to unilaterally use armed force against the host
State and to invoke self-defense, as the acts attributed to that
latter State (i.e. assisting, acquiescing, etc.) do not constitute an
armed attack but merely an indirect use of force57.
2. The conditions of implementation of the right of self-defense
The existence of an armed attack is a necessary condition, but not a
sufficient one, for authorizing a State to use force in self-defense. The
implementation of that right requires that the victim States also comply with three other “essential conditions for the admissibility of the
Ibid., at 123, para. 140.
See ILC Articles, supra note 20, in particular Arts. 28, 30 and 31.
56
Ibid., Art. 49.
57
Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 191.
54
55
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plea of self-defence in a given case”58: the customary59 requirements of
necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Before analyzing the condition of immediacy, it is important to determine the exact purpose of
self-defense, because the compliance of the action taken in self-defense
with the requirements of the necessity, proportionality and immediacy
is appreciated in light of this purpose.
a. The purpose of an action in self-defense
Operation Enduring Freedom and the recent airstrikes in Syria have
been justified by the desire to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks. The US Permanent Representative to the United Nations declared for example: “In response to [the 9/11 terrorist] attacks, and
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions
designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United
States.”60 In fact, what the intervening States called self-defense is
nothing more than the implementation of the nineteenth century
concept of self-help (known also as self- preservation or selfprotection) that could be invoked in many differing situations such
as preventing or deterring non-state actors from launching terrorist
attacks61. However, since the 1930s the purpose of the right of selfdefense has been limited to one of halting and repelling an armed
attack62.
Today, the very large majority of States and scholars agree that the
only admissible purpose of a military operation launched in selfdefense is to halt and/or to repel an armed attack63. Roberto Ago,
Roberto Ago, supra note 44, para. 119.
Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 176.
60
UN Doc. S/2001/946, 7 October 2001. See also UN Doc. S/2001/947.
61
See Humphrey Waldock, supra note 10, at 463-464; Ian Brownlie, supra note 2, at
43.
62
See the in-depth research conducted by Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Les réactions
décentralisées à l’illicite: des contre-mesures à la légitime défense, Paris, LGDJ,
1990, at 297
63
See notably Antonio Cassese, ‘Article 51’, in: Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet (dir.),
La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica,
2nd ed., 1991, at 775; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’,
Mich.L.Rev., vol. 82, num. 5 & 6, 1984, at 254; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and
Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994,
at 232; Judith Gardam, ‘Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus
58
59
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for example, underscored that “the objective to be achieved by the
conduct in question [i.e. self-defense], its raison d’être, is necessarily that of repelling an attack and preventing it from succeeding,
and nothing else”64. The term ‘preventing it from succeeding’ must
be interpreted as meaning ‘defeating an ongoing armed attack’65.
It is true that for many years now, some scholars and States66
have invoked other more controversial purposes for the right of
self-defense. According to those scholars, actions in self-defense
would be also authorized to prevent attacks and deter attackers from
launching operations in the future67. This stretching out of the selfdefense’s purpose has often been invoked in the context of the war
against terrorism, notably because terrorist operations are so sudden
and sporadic that it is therefore much easier to prevent or repel terrorist attacks than to halt ongoing ones. However, it must be stressed
that such a doctrine has never been confirmed by the actual State
practice which has never been neither constant nor uniform – conditions for the existence of a new customary rule68 – with regard to that
matter.
b. The condition of immediacy
The condition of immediacy is closely linked to the objective of
self-defense. The former raises the question of when can an action in self-defense be launched: before, during or after an armed
in Bello’, in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Philippe Sands (ed.), International
Law, The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 280
64
Roberto Ago, supra note 44, at 69, para. 119.
65
See Luigi Condorelli, ‘Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: où va le droit
international?’, RGDIP, t. 105, 2001, at 838.
66
Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 241-250.
67
See notably Louis Henkin, ‘The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy’, in: Henkin
Louis, et. al. (ed.), Right v. Might, International Law and the Use of Force, New
York, London, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989, at 45; Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Dordrecht, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, at 154; Jost Delbrück, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: Self-Defense or
Collective Security as International Police Action? Some Comments on the International Legal Implications of the ‘War Against Terrorism’’, GYIL, vol. 44, 2001, at 17.
68
For the conditions relating to the existence of a new customary rule, see Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, notably at 277; Continental
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985,
para. 27.
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attack? Operation Enduring Freedom and the air campaign in
Syria have been justified by the right of anticipatory self-defense
(i.e. preventing further attacks)69. However, an interpretation of the
letter and spirit of Article 51, the study of actual State practice subsequent to the adoption of the Charter, as well as the reading of the
International Court of Justice’s decisions, have led to the conclusion that the alleged right of anticipatory self- defense has no place
in international law to date.
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that “[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs”70. A textual interpretation
of the provision leads to a rejection of the doctrine of anticipatory
self- defense. Indeed, the wording ‘if an armed attack occurs’ is
clear and does not mean ‘if the threat of an armed attack occurs’.
In other words, and according to the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the condition stated in Article 51 – the existence of
an ongoing armed attack – is the only condition admitted for the
exercise of the right of self-defense71. In addition, and following a
purposive interpretation of the UN Charter, one can point out that
the will of those who drafted the Charter was to limit as much as
possible the right for States to use force in their international relations, and not to recognize a right of self-protection that could be
implemented every time they were threatened72.
It is a priori not impossible that, between 1945 and today, States
have expansively interpreted Article 51 and considered that nowadays the said provision authorizes States to use force in anticipation of an attack. In that case, actual State practice would have given
rise to a new customary law of anticipatory self-defense. This being
The operation in Syria is also carried out to eliminate continuing attacks from ISIL
against Iraq. See letter of the US Permanent Representative, supra note 32.
70
Emphasis added.
71
See Josef L. Kunz, supra note 38, at 878; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations. A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, London, Stevens, 1950,
at 797. Contra Myres S. McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, AJIL, vol. 57, num. 3, 1963, at 600.
72
Louis Henkin, supra note 8, at 142; Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in: Bruno
Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, Munich, C.
H. Beck, 2002, at 803.
69

438

Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015

Military Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism from the Standpoint of International Law

said, in order for a new customary law to emerge, actual practice
of “the international community of States as a whole”73, – a practice that reflects their opinio juris – must have been constant and
uniform. However, the examination of actual State practice leads to
the conclusion that the requirements of constancy and uniformity
have not (yet) been met. Indeed, since 1945, the operations justified by a right of self-defense in anticipation of terrorist attacks
show a radical division between States74. Few of them accepted a
legal right of anticipatory self-defense. Many qualified the military
operations as notably being aggressions75 or acts of aggression76.
The same division exists with regard to Operation Enduring Freedom. Although many States remained silent on the legality of the
operation – and it is therefore not easy to determine whether such a
silence was the expression of their approbation or, on the contrary,
of their condemnation of the operation – some States77 and international organizations78 claimed that the operation was justified by
the right of self-defense, while a few States openly qualified the
joint military operation as an aggression or in violation of the Afghan sovereignty79. This brief study of State practice subsequent to
the adoption of the UN Charter seems to show that States are divided on the question of whether the right of anticipatory self-defense
has a place in international law. Therefore, as the actual practice of
the international community of States as a whole is not uniform, as
well as not constant – and even if the international community as a
See Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at:
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
74
See Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 241-250.
75
With regard to Operation Litani (1978), see UN Docs. S/PV.2071, 2072 and 2073.
76
It was notably the case during the 1975 Israeli raid against Palestinian camps in
Lebanon, see UN Docs. S/PV.1859, 1860, 1861, 1862.
77
See notably Commonwealth of Dominica, UN Doc. A/56/PV.51, 13 November
2001, at 2; Republic of Moldova, UN Doc. A/56/PV.56, 16 November 2001, at 10;
Seychelles, UN Doc. A/56/PV.56, at 32; France, UN Doc. S/PV.4413, 12 November
2001, at 7; Norway, UN Doc. S/PV.4413, at 10.
78
NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington (collective self-defense),
‘Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson’, Press Release 138, 8 October 2001; European Union, UN Doc. A/56/PV.44, 10 November 2001, at 37.
79
See Cuba, UN Doc. A/56/PV.13, 1st October 2001; Iraq, UN Doc. A/56/PV.51, 13
November 2001; North Korea, UN Doc. A/56/PV.52, 14 November 2001.
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whole demonstrated an approbation of the operation in Syria, this
would not mean that the criteria of constancy is met – it may be
concluded that the right of anticipatory self- defense does not exist
in general international law.
The conclusions mentioned above are confirmed by judicial decisions80. In the Oil Platforms case, whose judgment was rendered
after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Court held:
“in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-defence, the
United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for
which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a
nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” within the meaning of
that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as
understood in customary law on the use of force”81. Therefore, the
Court states that the implementation of the right of self- defense requires the existence of an armed attack, and not only the existence
of a threat of attack; a condition not fulfilled in the case of Operation
Enduring Freedom.
B. THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Terrorism is a scourge that the international community attempts
to prevent and eradicate. Nevertheless, as mentioned supra, given that
most of the terrorist attacks are sudden, sporadic and not attributed to a
State, it is very difficult to justify a military counter-terrorism operation through the right of self-defense. If States consider it necessary to
use force against terrorists, and for their operations to be legal, it would
be then preferable for them to look for and apply the second exception
to the principle prohibiting the use of force: an authorization by the
Security Council to use armed force. Their military operations would
be consequently an application of the mechanism of collective security
– at least of its spirit if not of its letter– provided for by the Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.
Collective security can be defined as a system in which, when
peace and security of a State are undermined or about to be affected,
80
81

See also Nicaragua case, supra note 34, paras. 176, 195 and 232.
Oil Platforms case, supra note 34, para. 51 (emphasis added).

440

Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015

Military Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism from the Standpoint of International Law

and this breach has or leads to a risk of repercussions at the regional
or international level, so other Members of the UN Organization unite
and join forces against the peace-breaker in order to maintain or restore
peace and security. In 1945, the drafters of the Charter wanted the
system of collective security to be based on a complete centralization
of the legitimate use of force82. In other words, collective enforcement
actions had to be decided and directed by a central organ of the Organization, namely the Security Council which is sometimes qualified
as “the embodiement of the collective”83.
Member States have given a number of powers to the Security Council, in particular those mentioned under Chapter VII. This Chapter, entitled “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression”, is the very heart of the system of collective security. Chapter VII starts with Article 39 that provides: “[t]he Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This provision, sometimes defined as the “single most important provision of the
Charter”84, may be considered as the cornerstone of the system of collective security in the sense that it contains a summary of the powers
given to the Security Council and necessary for the implementation of
the mechanism of collective security: to determine the existence of a
specific situation first, and then to decide what measures to take in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
1. The power of determination
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression”. Before examining how the Security
Council qualifies terrorism and terrorist-related behaviors, it seems important to clarify the scope of the power of determination.
Hans Kelsen, supra note 38, at 784-785.
Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Inadequacy of ‘Collective Security’’, Finnish Y.B. Int’l
L., vol. 9, 1998, at 39. See also Article 24, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter.
84
U.S. Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations : Report to the President
on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United
States Delegation, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945, at 90-91.
82
83
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a. General observations
First of all, the Security Council’s power consisting of determining
whether a threat to, or a breach of, the peace, or an act of aggression
exists is the condition sine qua non required for the adoption, then,
of military or non military enforcement measures under Articles
41 and 4285. Moreover, the Council cannot delegate this power to
any other entity, be it a State or an international organization86. Furthermore, as Article 39 empowers but does not oblige the Security
Council to act, the Council is under no obligation to make a determination vis-à-vis a concrete situation, even if on the basis of
its past practice the said situation could be objectively and clearly
qualified as a threat to, or a breach of, the peace, or an act of aggression87. Also, as evidenced infra, the determination of a threat to the
peace does not require the prior existence of a breach of the law by
a State. In other words, to be qualified as such, a threat to the peace
must not necessarily be the result of the wrongful act of a State88.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Security Council’s power of determination is subject to certain limitations. Indeed, in the Tadic
case, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia declared: “The Security Council is an
organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which
serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations,
however broad its powers under the constitution may be”.89 As an
example of constitutional limitations, one may notably mention the
obligation for the Security Council, and therefore for its Members,
Jean Combacau, ‘Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies : résurrection ou métamorphose?’, in : Rafâa Ben Achour, Slim Laghmani, Les nouveaux
aspects du droit international, Rencontres internationales de la Faculté des sciences
juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis, colloque des 14, 15 et 16 avril 1994, Paris,
Pedone, 1994, at 144-145.
86
Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security,
The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, at 33.
87
Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 354.
88
See for example Resolution 1440 (2002) related to the act of taking hostages in
Moscow by non-state actors.
89
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para.
28.
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to “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations”.90
b. Terrorism and the “threat to the peace”
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Security Council has been
qualifying terrorism only as the first of the three cases mentioned
in Article 39, namely a threat to the peace. This notion needs
to be defined. Peace may be considered as a state of stability and
order91. The state of peace is thus threatened when a destabilizing
and potentially explosive situation emerges. In the field of international relations, it may be asserted that a threat to the peace is
the resultant of a destabilization of the international security. Since
1945, such a destabilization has taken different forms. According to
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, threats
to international security are constituted by “[a]ny event or process
that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system”.92
Terrorism has been identified as such a ‘event or process’.93
It is only progressively that the Security Council has realized that
terrorism impinges on international peace and security. The first
relevant resolutions did not address the issue of terrorism in general
but merely some of its modus operandi, such as the taking of hostages or hijackings.94 Then, since 1992, the Security Council qualifies the acts of ‘international terrorism’ as threats to the international
Article 24, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. This obligation was also pointed out
in Tadic case, para. 29. On the principle of good faith, see Eric Corthay, supra note
3, at 359-367.
91
Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, (ed. by Joseph Chitty),
Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 1853, Book II, Chap. IV, para. 1.
92
A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and
Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, 2 December 2004, at 12.
93
Other clusters of threats identified by the High-level Panel are economic and social
threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; interState conflict; internal conflict, including civil war,
genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; and
transnational organized crime.
94
See for example Resolution 579 (1985).
90
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peace and security.95 Finally, from 2003 onwards, the Council continuously reaffirms that ‘terrorism’, in all its forms and manifestation, – and no longer merely ‘international’ terrorism – constitutes
one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.96
Moreover, in parallel, the Security Council constantly reaffirms that
it is also crucial for the maintenance of international peace and
security to combat and defeat terrorism,97 this having to be done
in accordance with the UN Charter and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian
law.98 An in-depth examination of the Security Council’s practice
following the perpetration of terrorist acts reveals that at least four
different terrorist-related situations have been qualified as a threat
to international peace and security: primo, the non-compliance by
a government with the requests set out by the Security Council in
a previous resolution99; secondo, the terrorist acts per se100; tertio,
the terrorist acts and their implications101; and quatro, some terrorist
See Resolution 731 (1992) related to the Lockerbie bombing, Resolution 1373
(2001), Resolution 1377 (2001), Resolution 1438 (2002) related to Bali bombings,
Resolution 1440 (2002) related to the hostage-taking terrorist attack in Moscow,
Resolution 1450 (2002) related to the bombing at the Paradise Hotel in Kenya and
the attempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines flight 582.
96
See Resolutions 1530 (2004), 1535 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1611 (2005), 1617
(2005), 1618 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1787 (2007), 1805 (2008), 1822
(2008), 1904 (2009), 1963 (2010), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2129 (2013), 2133
(2014), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014).
97
See notably Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992), 1044 (1996), 1054 (1996), 1189
(1998), 1214 (1998), 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2129 (2013), 2133
(2014), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014).
98
See for example Resolutions 1269 (1999), 1438 (2002), 1440 (2002), 1450 (2002),
1455 (2003), 1530 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1611 (2005), 1618 (2005), 1624 (2005),
1822 (2008), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014)
99
See Resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) related to the Lockerbie bombing,
Resolution 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996) related to the assassination attempt of President Mubarak.
100
See for example Resolution 1438 (2002) related to Bali bombings, Resolution
1450 (2002) related to the bombing at the Paradise Hotel in Kenya, Resolution 1530
(2004) related to Madrid bombings, Resolution 1611 (2005) related to London bombings.
101
See Resolution 1644 (2005) related to the bombing that killed former Lebanese
Prime Minister Hariri and the subsequent risk of destabilization of the country
95
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groups and those associated with them.102
2. The authorization to use force
according to Article 39, after having determined the existence of a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council shall “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security”. While Article 41 refers to non-military enforcement measures, Article 42 is related to military enforcement ones. The following
part focuses on the implementation of military measures and aims at
describing the original scheme set out in the Chapter VII in 1945
before analyzing the new practice developed by the Security Council
mainly since the end of the Cold War. It will be shown that under the
new practice established by the Council at least two large military operations mandated to counter terrorism have been constituted.
a. From a centralized process to decentralized operations
The founding fathers of the UN Charter had designed a very centralized mechanism for the implementation of military enforcement
measures. However, this original mechanism was never implemented as such and therefore the Security Council decided to develop
a new practice, in conformity with the spirit of the Chapter VII,
which consisted of delegating its enforcement powers to Member
States.
i. The scheme set out in chapter VII
Article 42 of the UN Charter provides: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
The implementation of such an action is set out in the Articles
which follow. These provisions do not envisage the establishment of ‘an international army’ but stipulate that “[a]ll Members
of the United Nations […] undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and faciliSee for example Resolutions 1617 (2005), 1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012) related to
Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it.
102
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ties […] necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.” (Art. 43, para. 1). These agreements shall
be concluded between the Security Council and UN Members
and aim to govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree
of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities
and assistance to be provided (Art. 43, paras. 2 and 3). The
Security Council shall exercise strong command and control
over the national troops made available to it. Indeed, assisted
and advised by a Military Staff Committee, the Council shall
determine the strength and degree of readiness of the contingents, their employment, plans for their combined action, the
regulation of armaments and possible disarmament (Arts. 45
to 47). Thus, it is clear that Chapter VII set out a very centralized process for combined international enforcement measures,
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
ii. A new practice: the authorization to use armed forced
It is important to note that the original collective security
scheme explained supra has never been implemented as such.
Due to political and ideological divergences, the special agreements mentioned under Article 43 have never been concluded,
and without these agreements and multinational contingents under its command and control the Security Council is obviously
not able to take military action – stricto sensu – as may be necessary. Therefore, for the Security Council the alternative was as
follows: either to renounce the idea of taking military operation
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to develop and implement a new practice in conformity
with the spirit – and not with the letter – of the Chapter VII, a
practice progressively accepted by the international community.103 The Council chose the second option. Indeed, it has often
authorized Member States or regional arrangements to use force
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security,
Robert Kolb, Ius contra bellum, Le droit international relatif au maintien de la
paix, Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle, Bruylant, Bruxelle, 2003, at 93. In the opinion of
the present writer, the authority of the Security Council to authorize the use of armed
force by States is not founded on Article 42 but rather on the theory of implied powers, see Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 381-385.
103
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especially since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the
Security Council has often transferred or delegated to States
some of its discretionary enforcement powers under Chapter
VII.104 This process of delegation introduces an element of decentralization in the system of collective security in the sense
that now States decide on a voluntary basis whether, to which
degree and for how long, they will take the necessary measures
called for by the Council.105
iii. Two types of joint military operations
The Security Council’s practice authorizing States to use force
has led to the creation of two different types of military operations: the peace operations (blue helmets) and the multinational operations. In the context of the fight against terrorism one
could mention at least two combined military operations for
which the Security Council has authorized States to use force:
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
MINUSMA was established by Resolution 2100 (2013)106
adopted under Chapter VII. This is an example of hybrid peace
operations which are defined by Tardy as “operations that bring
together two or more international actors that operate simultaneously or sequentially and the activities of which imply a
certain degree of inter institutional cooperation”.107 The mission is comprised of more than ten thousand military personnel and around one thousand five hundred police personnel
from more than thirty countries. Its mandate is in essence to
support the political process in Mali and to carry out a number
of security-related stabilization tasks.108 The Mission in Mali is
Danesh Sarooshi, supra note 86, at 13.
Jochen Abraham Frowein, Nico Krisch, ‘Article 42’, in : Simma Bruno (ed.),
The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, vol. I, 2002, at 756.
106
Resolution 2165 (2014) extends the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2015.
107
Tierry Tardy, ‘Hybrid Peace Operations’, Global Governance, vol. 20, num. 1, Jan.Mar. 2014, at 97
108
For more information, see MINUSMA, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/.
104
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not deployed to conduct offensive counter- terrorism operations
because “[t]he United Nations is not configured to oversee such
operations at a strategic level, nor are its peacekeepers typically
trained, equipped or experienced in this kind of operations”.109
With regard to the threat posed by terrorists and other groups,
MINUSMA is primarily a mission of stabilization and protection: stabilization of key population centres and support for
the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country,
protection of civilians and UN personnel, support for humanitarian assistance and protection of cultural and historical sites.110
It operates with the support of an EU training mission and previously with the French Operation Serval which itself counted on
EU countries for notably in-air refueling activities.
ISAF has been established by Resolution 1386 (2001) adopted
under Chapter VII. Indeed, in December 20, the Security Council “[a]uthorizes […] the establishment […] of an International
Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”.
Since August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation and has been responsible for the command, coordination
and planning of the force. In October 2003, Resolution 1510
extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan.
As of today, around forty eight nations provide more than forty
thousand military personnel to ISAF.111 The mission of ISAF
is multi-facetted and notably consists of assisting the Afghan
Government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment, strengthening the institutions, supporting the growth
in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supporting reconstruction and development in the
country, and supporting humanitarian assistance. Moreover, and
although this is first and foremost the mission of the Coalition
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2013/189,
para. 70.
110
See Resolution 2100 (2013) and 2165 (2014).
111
See Troop numbers and contributions, available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troopnumbers-and- contributions/index.php.
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(i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom), ISAF, together with ANSF,
also carry out combat operations against the Taliban and other
terrorist groups.112
It should be noted that in both cases – and this is what happens in
most of the situations113– the host States (Mali and Afghanistan)
had already consented to the military operations before the
adoption of the Resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2100 (2013).114
A priori such consents are sufficient to consider the operations
as lawful. However, adopting a resolution serves several purposes. Primo, as explained by Corten, “the Security Council
tends, though, to make military action independently of the
existence, and also of the scope, of the State’s consent. The
very purpose of this type of resolution is to confer extended and
autonomous power on the intervening force that is dependent
solely on the will of the Security Council itself.”115 Secondo,
sometimes the host State itself requests the Security Council to
consider authorizing the deployment of a UN mandated force,
because the presence of foreign troops under an impartial UN
mandate would be easier to accept for local populations used to
imperialist invasions.116
b. The letter of the resolutions authorizing the use of force
The authorization given to States to use armed force must fall
under a decision of the Security Council. The power to use
force is not transferred to States as long as the Council has not
clearly and formally decided so. This requirement is due to the
fact that a Security Council’s authorization is an exception to
the principle prohibiting the use of force, and it should and must
See for example ‘Afghan, ISAF forces launch Operation Spin Ghar’, press release 2007-689, available at: http://www.nato.int.
113
See Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, at 253
114
Regarding the consent given by Afghanistan to the deployment of ISAF, see
Annex to the letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc. S/2001/1223.
115
Olivier Corten, supra note 6, at 314.
116
See Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions (Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan),
UN Doc. S/2001/1154, dated 5 December 2001.
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stay that way. An authorization, for example, must not be presumed from a resolution by which the Council only determines
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression.117 The non-observance of this requirement of
clarity and formalism could lead to a multiplication of military
operations and therefore could undermine the system of collective security.118
The Security Council’s practice consisting of authorizing States
to use force is varied. Most of the time, the resolutions do not
lay down expressis verbis the authorization to resort ‘to armed
force’, but only stipulates that States are authorized to take ‘all
necessary measures’ or ‘all necessary means’ to fulfill the Council’s mandate. For example, in paragraph 3 of Resolution 1386
(2001), the Security Council “[a]uthorizes the Member States
participating in the International Security Assistance Force to
take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”. As well, in
paragraph 12 of Resolution 2164 (2014), the Council “[a]uthorizes MINUSMA to take all necessary means to carry out its
mandate”. At first glance, a brief examination of State practice is
sufficient to conclude that these wordings usually imply a resort
to military action. However, in order to be absolutely certain
that the will of the Council is to authorize the resort to armed
force, a case by case examination of the debates and declarations
of States surrounding each resolution needs to be conducted.119
Once engaged in theater, it is obvious that UN mandated forces must respect and apply the rules of international law, such
as the human rights and the international humanitarian law.120
They must also respect the terms of the mandate decided by the
Security Council in its resolutions and are only authorized to
Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 387.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, ‘L’autorisation par la Conseil de Sécurité de recourir
a la force : une tentative d’évaluation’, Collected Courses…, t. 106, num. 1, 2002,
at 47.
119
Olivier Corten, supra note 6, at 327.
120
See notably Alexandre Faite, Jérémie Labbé Grenier (ed.), Expert Meeting on
Multinational Peace Operations, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law
and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, Geneva, 11-12 December 2003, ICRC, October 2004, 93 p.
117
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take action within the framework established by the mandate.
Although the Security Council authorizes States to use ‘all’ necessary means or measures, it is worth mentioning that States
have no unconditional right to use force. On the contrary, they
have merely the right to use force that is necessary to fulfill the
mandate established by the Council. Therefore, under the jus
contra bellum, the legality of a military measure depends upon
the objectives of the mandate. Any other military action would
be considered as a violation of the principle prohibiting the use
of force.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of international law, military operations in the
context of the fight against terrorism – by one State or by a coalition
of States – are subject to the very strict rules of the jus contra bellum,
as other operations in other contexts are as well. In other words,
there is no lex specialis that would merely apply to the war against terrorism. Lawful or not, the relevance and efficiency of military operations launched in the context of the fight against terrorism need to be
questioned. When the objective or mandate includes missions of stabilization, protection, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, a real
chance for restoring and maintaining peace and security exists. However, when the objective or mandate of the operation is limited to targeting and destroying terrorist capabilities, its degree of effectiveness,
in the middle or long run, is more debatable. Too often, those
targeted and limited operations cause an escalation of violence and
a spiral of reprisals. Armed violence induces more terrorism, and both
of them risk generating innocent victims, a burning sense of injustice
and a dangerous grudge.
As terrorism is a universal and complex scourge, the international
community has wisely recognized and stressed that it “can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active
participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist
threat”.121 Necessary collective and multidimensional actions include, but
121

See for example Resolution 2170 (2014).
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are not limited to, the elimination of ethnic and religious discriminations,
the establishment of the rule of law, the promotion of tolerance and dialogue among civilizations, information sharing, as well as judicial cooperation.122 These measures are a huge undertaking in that they require a
sustainable effort over many years, measures however that remain vital
and indispensable. Last but not least, in order to succeed in that mission,
to avoid misunderstandings and mitigate the risks of abuse, it is also essential that the international community continues to commit all effort to
the adoption of a comprehensive convention which contains a clear and
universally accepted definition of terrorism.
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